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SPEECH OR NOT: APPLYING ELECTION
LAW STRICT SCRUTINY TO CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REGULATIONS
Abstract: This Note will argue that even if money is not speech for First
Amendment purposes, canipaigi ► contributions and expenditures are
still crucial elements of the electoral process and ought to receive some
constitutional protection. The United States Supreme Court has in its
own election law jurisprudence the analytical tools required to strike a
proper balance between the constitutional necessity of a free electoral
system and the need to keep elections fair, open, honest and free from
corruption. This Note will argue that under the Elections Clause and
Qualifications Clause of the United States Constitution, Congress has
neither plenary power to regulate campaign finances nor is Congress
absolutely barred from enacting all but the most minimal . restrictions.
Rather, the Supreme Court should apply a balancing test to determine
whether a particular campaign finance regulation violates the basic
principles of the electoral system.
INTRODUCTION
In January 2000, the United States Supreme Court decided the
case of Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC ("SloinkPACV which
upheld the basic framework of Buckley v. 17a/eo 2—the seminal 1976
campaign finance case. Buckley was sustained by a six to three vote in
ShrinkPAC and applied to state campaign finance laws. 3 The division
on the Supreme Court in ShrinkPAC demonstrates that Buckley's future
is somewhat uncertain. No fewer than six Justices (Stevens, 4 Breyer,5
Ginsburg, Kennedy, 6
 Thomas,? and Scalia) express some dissatisfac-
120 S. Ct. 897 (2000).
2 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
3 ShrinkPAC, 120 S. Ct. at 901.
4 See id, at 910 (Stevens, j., concurring) (arguing that money used for political cam-
paigns is not speech, per sc, and should be treated only us "speech by proxy").
11 See id. at 914 (Breyer, J., concurring) (contending that Buckley does not and the
Court should not reject an equality rationale for campaign finance restrictions and that it
is perfectly appropriate for the government to prevent the voice of the few from drowning
out the voices of the many).
6 See id. at 914-16 (Kennedy,., dissenting) (proposing that Buckley be overruled to al-
low for less government regulation and that the entire system does a great disservice to the
First Amendment).
7 See ShrinkPAC., 120 . 5. Ct. at 916-17 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that Burkky
should be overruled to prohibit significant regulation).
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don with Buckley and Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia and Justice Tho-
mas explicitly argue that Buckley ought to be overruIed.8
In addition to the dissatisfaction with Buckley expressed by some
members of the Court, there has been an increase in calls for cam-
paign finance reform from the media and several of the Presidential
capdidates. 9 It has become dogmatic among politicians of both parties
that congressional politics in Washington are corrupted by "huge"
infusions of cash into campaign coffers.° Given the decades old de-
bate and the sharp disagreements between the opinions of Justice
Breyer," who seems amenable to overruling or at least interpreting
Buckley to allow for more regulation,, and Justice Thomas, 12 who ar-
gues that Buckley ought to be overruled to allow only minimal regula-
tion, this dispute seems likely to continue.
The Supreme Court's holding in Buckley forms the basis for the
constitutional analysis of .campaign finance regulations. Buckley held
that campaign expenditures were equivalent to speech and therefore
statutes limiting them would have to withstand strict scrutiny.° The
Court also ruled that contributions were not equivalent to political
speech but involved mostly associational rights and could be constitu-
tionally justified." The Court also sustained disclosure and reporting
requirements, a voluntary system of public financing, and the powers
of the Federal Election Commission. 15
8 See id. at 916 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), 916-19 (Thomas, j., dissenting).
9 See Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Fi-
nance Reform, 105 YALE U. 1049, 1054 (1996) (noting that in 1995 more than 400 newspa-
pers editorialized in favor of campaign finance reform). 'Me editorial push for campaign
finance reform only intensified after the 1996 elections. See, e.g., A Fundraiser's Guilty Ver-
dict, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, '2000, at A23 (noting the conviction of Maria Hsia, a Democratic
party fundraiser and associate of Vice President Al Gore for illegal activities relating to a
fundraiser held at a Buddhist temple in California and advocating more stringent cam-
paign finance laws). From January 1, 1999 to March of 2000, there were more than 3000
editorial and op-ed pieces favoring campaign finance reform.
to See Smith, supra note 9, at 1059.
ti See ShrinkPAC, 120 S. Ct. at 914 (Breyer, j., concurring).
12 See id. at 916-17 (Thomas, j., dissenting).
13 Sec Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39, 44-45.
1.1 See id. at 26-27.
15 See id. at 143-44. The current system of campaign financing closely mirrors this
Buckley framework. Individual contributors are limited to making donations of $1,000 per
candidate, per election. 2 U.S.C. § 44 la(a) (1)(A) (1994). Political action committees are
limited to contributing $5,000 per candidate, per election. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (2) (A)
(1998). There is also an overall cap of $25,000 on individual contributions to all candi-
dates in one calendar year. Id. (1) (B)—(C). Most of the existing controversy over campaign
finance reform is over su-called Noll" money. Soft !none) , is not subject to federal regula-
tion and consists of contributions made to political parties and independent committees
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In Buckley, the Supreme Court stated that "[t] he constitutional
power of Congress to regulate federal elections is well established and
not questioned by any of the parties in this case." 1 ° The Court then
cites to several cases to support this proposition. 17
 Without analysis,
the Buckley Court assumed plenary congressional power over federal
election campaigns based on the Elections Clause. 18 As it was not con-
tested in the case, this question is technically open. Subsequent deci-
sions and the passage of time, however, suggest that it is, in practice, if
not in fact, the constitutional doctrine of the clay. The Court has po-
liced state attempts to regulate elections and has developed a large
body of law governing the electoral process and the limits on state
regulation. Unfortunately, the campaign finance debate has focused
almost exclusively on the classification of money as political speech
and on a First Amendment analysis of the problem.i°
This Note will argue that even if money is not speech, campaign
contributions and expenditures are still crucial elements of the elec-
toral process and ought to receive some constitutional protection. In
recent years, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a willingness to
reopen questions that were thought to have been long since de-
cided. 2° There is, perhaps, a way out of the contentious First Amend-
ment morass by way of an analysis of the goals of the electoral scheme
created by the Constitution. The Court has, in its own election law
jurisprudence, the analytical tools to clear away some of the confu-
sions of Buckley and strike a proper balance between the constitutional
necessity of a free electoral system and the need to keep elections fair,
open, honest and free from corruption. This Note will argue that the
Elections Clause and Qualifications Clause of the United States Con-
stitution sketch the rough outlines of the ideas that ought to animate
the electoral system.
which then use the money to indirectly,
 support candidates. Federal election law prohibits
the use of soft money to support a particular candidate; it may only he used for general
issue advocacy and party building.
36 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13,
37 Id. at 13 n.16.
18 U.S. CONS'''. art. I, § 4.
19
 See generally Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable
Dilemmas, 94 Comm. L. REV. 1258 (1994); Vincent Blasi, Fire Speech and Ike Widening Gyre of
Fund-Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94
Cowin. L. REA'. 1281 (1994); Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption. Equality and
Campaign Finance, 86 6E0.14 45 (1997).
28
 See generally, e.g., United States v. Lopez. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Cain
Free Schools Act on the grounds that it exceeded Congress' authority to regulate under
the Commerce Clause; it was the first law struck down on such grounds since 1937).
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Applying the principles of this system to the issue of campaign
finance regulation, Congress has neither plenary power to regulate
campaign finances nor is Congress absolutely barred from enacting
all but the most minimal restrictions. Rather, the Supreme Court
should apply a balancing test, based on the balancing test used in its
election law jurisprudence, to determine whether a particular cam-
paign finance regulation violates the basic principles of the electoral
system. Because of the importance of political campaigns to the elec-
toral process and the need of those campaigns to spend money to
communicate their ideas, the Court should apply strict scrutiny to the
entirety of campaign finance laws. Just as in the election law cases, this
does not mean that all reform efforts will he doomed to failure. To
the contrary, significant regulation would be permissible under such a
scheme but it must be justified by a compelling government interest
and be narrowly tailored. Many common sense ballot restrictions have
been upheld by the Supreme Court and similar campaign finance
laws would pass constitutional muster as well.
Part I of this Note will discuss the origins of the twin provisions
creating a federal electoral order: the Qualifications Clause and the
Elections Clause.21 Part II will discuss the two major cases interpreting
the Qualifications Clause. 22 Part HI will discuss the cases interpreting
the Elections Clause, relied on by and culminating in Buckley. 23 Part IV
of this Note will review relevant Supreme Court decisions regulating
election law, primarily on the state level. Finally, Part V of this Note
will analyze the law discussed and argue that there are both significant
powers given to Congress and important internal and external limits
on that power. The Note will argue that Buckley ought to be over-
turned and that campaign finance regulations ought to be analyzed as
election regulations and subject to the same considerations the Court
has used in limiting the powers of states to govern the electoral proc-
ess. Informed by this body of law, the new constitutional test for cam-
paign finance regulations suggested in this Note will preserve the cru-
cial balance between a free electoral system and an honest electoral
system.
21 See infra notes 23-57 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 58-9t) and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 97-168.
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I, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTORAL SCHEME
Article 1, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution
reads: "No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have at
 to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen
of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabi-
tant of that State in which he shall be chosen." 24
 Article 1, Section 4 of
the United States Constitution reads: "The Times, Places and Manner
of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be pre-
scribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may
at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the
Places of chusing Senators." 25
 These two provisions, the former known
as the Qualifications Clause and the latter as the Elections Clause, are
closely connected in the constitutional electoral scheme.28 Together,
they embody the constitutional principles of national uniformity and
popular sovereignty.
Alexander Hamilton, the principle expositor and defender of the
Elections Clause, wrote that there was no "article in the whole plan
more completely defensible than this." 27
 Hamilton's argument was
based in the need for the federal government to possess "the means
of its own preservation."28
 Hamilton feared that state control of the
election of federal legislators would "prove the seed of future weak-
ness, and perhaps anarchy."29 Hamilton worried that states opposed to
federal policy would use their control over elections to handicap gov-
eminent operations, much the same way that states had crippled the
national government under the Articles of Confederation." Hamil-
ton's fears were echoed by James Iredell, who argued that it was both
"natural and proper" for every government to possess the means for
its own preservation. 31 To leave elections in the hands of the states,
would leave the new federal government "at their mercy." 32 James
Madison feared that without a federal power to regulate elections, the
federal government would be subject to "dissolution" at the hands of
2'4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
25 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
2° S'ee United Stales v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299; 311,316 (1941).
27
 TILE FEDERALIST No. 59, at 362 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
[hereinafter No. 59].
28 Id.
2° Id.
3° See id. al 361-63.
51
 4 DEI3ATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 54 ( ,l. Elliot ed., 1996) ( hereinafter
ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
32 No. 59, supra note 27, at 363.
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a single state or a small cabal seeking to disrupt the flow of national
policy." At the same time, proponents of the Constitution sought to
assuage fears of a federal usurpation of the states by emphasizing the
limited scope of the Elections Clause.m
The Federalists saw the Elections Clause as granting procedural
power over the conduct of federal elections." "Whether the electors
should vote by ballot or viva voce, should assemble at this place or that
place; should be divided into districts or all meet at one place, shd
[sic] all vote for all the representatives or all in a district vote for a
number allotted to the district" were all questions covered by the
Elections Clause, with power divided between the states and the fed-
eral government, according to James Madison." One delegate to the
North Carolina convention declared that "the power over manner
only enables them to determine how these electors shall elect—
whether by ballot, or by vote, or by any other way." 37 The authority of
the Elections Clause was to be "expressly restricted to regulation of
the times, places, and manner of elections."" Hamilton stated that the .
power given to the federal government by the Elections Clause would
be insufficient to effect a substantive federal policy that preferred one
sort of candidate to another." The phrase "time, place and manner"
was to be read quite literally, in terms which all political men of that
age could understand.°
33 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 311 (M. Farrand ed., 1937) [hereinafter
RECORDS1.
3-1 See 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, ittpra note 31, at 55, 68. Opponents of the Constitution
feared that Congress would use what they saw as the vast powers of the Elections Clause to
establish election regulations that would prefer candidates of a particular class or faction.
See id. I•edell responded by emphasizing the limits of the powers conferred by the Elec-
tions Clause, for example, that regulation of the time of election was limited only to the
period within the two year term for Representatives embodied in Article I, Section 2. See id.
at 53.
3" 2 RECORDS, Stlpin note 33, at 240 (comments of James Madison); see also United
States, Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 833-34 (1995); supra notes 64-72 and
accompanying text.
36 SIT 2 REcoans, supra note 33, at 240-41.
" 7 4 Ewofs DEBATES, supra note 31, at 71 (statement of Mr. Steele).
38 THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
[hereinafter No. 60j.
39 See id. at 371. Critics of the Constitution feared that it would elevate the concerns of
the mercantile class over that of the landed, farming classes.
") See 3 RECORDS, sit firm note 33, at 267. 1n this speech to the Massachusetts convention,
Rufus King noted that the electoral scheme allowed for some differences based on each
state's peculiarities; for example, in Massachusetts' elections "the manner was by ballot,
and the places towns." Id. There was also some concern that the "time" provision in the
Elections Clause would permit Congress wide latitude, perhaps allowing elections to be
December 2000)
	 A Comstibitional Campaign Finance Reform	 179
The Federalists sounded two major themes in their defense of
the Elections Clause—it was necessary to prevent individual states
from altering election regulations so as to disrupt the flow of national
government and there was a need for uniformity between states to
protect the federal right to vote:" The Elections Clause creates a sys-
tem of power-sharing between the states and the national govern-
ment, with the latter as final arbiter of election rules 4 2
 This would
prevent "a combination of a few [ambitious] men, in a few of the most
considerable States" from thwarting the desire of a majority of the na-
tion's people by discontinuing "the choice of members for the federal
House of Representatives.43
 Additionally, Madison argued, the Elec-
tions Clause would empower the federal government to prevent a ma-
jority in one state from further extending its power by diluting the
federal voting rights of minorities." At the same time, however, this
grant of power was not plenary and the Federalists took great pains to
demonstrate the limited nature of the Elections Clause.
The fear that the federal government would privilege the rights
of some men over others also animated the debate over the
Qualifications Clause. James Wilson argued that any list of
qualifications for office was inappropriate. 45
 Gouvernor Morris ar-
gued that disqualifying certain people from holding office was the
same as limiting the suffrage rights of the electors. 46
 Others argued
for a more extensive list of qualifications and there was considerable
held only once every twenty years. See 4 Emor's DEBArEs. supra note 31, at 55. Future
Supreme Court justice James Iredell responded that this term was 'bilked by the cont-
mand of Article I, Section 2, that the House of Representatives he elected every two years.
See id. at 54.
41 No. 59, supra note 27, at 363; 3 RECORDS, SHIM/ note 33, at 311. States could "at any
moment annihilate [the federal government] by neglecting to provide for the choice of
persons to administer its affairs." No. 59, supin note 27, at 363. James Madison argued that
"should the people of any state, by any means, be deprived of the right of suffi-age, it was
judged proper that it should be remedied by the general government." 3 REcoRns,
note 33, at 311. Both Madison and Rt this King pointed to South Carolina as an example of
the sort of representational inequalities the Elections Clause sought to avert on the na-
tional level. See id. at 267, 311. South Carolina apportioned their state representatives in
the state constitution, the result being that, at the time of the adoption of the Federal
Constitution, Charleston, by the operation of state constitutional law, was grossly overrep-
resented in the state assembly, to the detriment of those in the areas that were less popu-
lated when the representational scheme of South Carolina was adopted. See id.
42 See 3 RECORDS, supra note 33, at 267-68.
43 No. 59, supra note 27, at 366.
44 See 3 REcomos, supra note 33, at 311-12.
46 See 2 RECORDS, supra note 33, at 251,
4C,
	 id. at 121-22.
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debate over which would be included in the Constitution. 47 James
Madison, during a debate over whether to exclude debtors from'be-
ing elected to Congress, argued that only those who failed to account
for their receipt of public funds should be so banished.° Gouvernor
Morris emphasized the qualifications of the voters was more impor-
tant and feared that government would interfere with the choices of
the electorate if too many qualifications were required.°
Madison was particularly concerned with leaving discretionary
power to exclude members in the hands of the Congress." Madison
argued that the "qualifications of electors and elected were funda-
mental articles in a Republican Govt. and ought to be fixed by the
Constitution:51 Leaving it solely in the hands of the Legislature would
be to vest it with an "improper and dangerous power" and if "the Leg-
islature could regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert the
Constitution?" Madison feared that "[q]ualifications founded on
artificial distinctions may be devised, by the stronger in order to keep
out partizans [sic] of a (weaker) faction?"
What we are left with, then, is au electoral system with a mixture
of state and federal control and with the ultimate procedural author-
ity vested in Congress and the substantive issues left to the decisions of
the people. The federal government would possess the means of its
own preservation in the Elections Clause but would be restrained
from showing partiality in choosing its successors. This tension, be-
tween structural integrity and substantive freedom, is felt in the realm
of campaign finance reform. Excessive reforms could operate as sub-
stantive bars to election for certain classes of candidates while in-
sufficient regulation would leave the federal election system open to
corruption and to subversion by state power.
II. INTERPRETING THE QUALIFICATIONS CLAUSE-
POWELL AND THORNTON
In United States v. Classic the United States Supreme Court stated
that "the free choice by the people of representatives in Congress,
47 See id. at 120-22.
18 See id. at 122.
19 See id. at 121-22.
5° See 2 RECORDS, supra note 33, at 249-50.
51 Id.
52
53 Id. at 250; VC THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 293-98 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1061).
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subject only to the restrictions to be found in §§ 2 and 4 of Article I
and elsewhere in the Constitution, was one of the great purposes of
our constitutional scheme of government cannot be doubted." 54 This
intimate connection between the Qualifications Clause and the Elec-
tions Clause calls for a further examination of the former in the effort
to determine the proper reading of the latter. This Part will discuss
the two major Qualifications Clause decisions.
In 1968, in Powell v. McCormack, the Supreme Court held that
Congress could not, under its Article I, Section 5 power to judge the
qualifications of its members, exclude a duly elected Representative
who satisfied the Qualifications Clause. 55
 Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. was
a New York City Representative; he was accused of misusing federal
money and prevented from taking his seat by a majority vote of the
House of Representatives. 56
 Powell argued that the House could only
exclude members for failing to meet one of three qualifications ex-
pressly laid out in Article I, Section 2 and that he had been unconsti-
tutionally denied his seat." After reviewing English Parliamentary his-
tory, the records of the Constitutional Convention and the ratification
debates, the Court, in an opinion authored by Chief justice Earl War-
ren, held that the Founders intended to limit the necessary
qualifications to those listed in Article I, Section 2 and that Congress
had impermissibly exceeded the bounds of its Article I, Section 5
power in excluding Powel1. 58
 Therefore, the Court held that Powell
had been unconstitutionally denied his seat and could take office. 59
Chief Justice Warren reasoned implicitly that the electoral
scheme adopted by the Founders placed an emphasis on the demo-
cratic principle that the people are the ultimate judge of the elected
officials and the source of the political order. 60
 "A fundamental prin-
ciple of our representative democracy is, in Hamilton's words, 'that
the people should choose whom they please to govern them.'"61 The
M 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941).
55
 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549-50 (1968).
56 Id. at 490-91.
51 See id. at 492-93.
58
 See id. at . 548.
59
 See id. at 550. The Court also held that Congress could have expelled Powell for
conduct during that term (but not for conduct in prior terms) but since the vote had been
on exclusion and not expulsion, the Court could not have calculated whether he would
have been expelled by his colleagues if that was the basis of the excluding vote. See id. at
506-12.
60
 See Powell, 395 U.S. at 547.
6 1 Id. at 547.
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Powell opinion analyzed the same debate discussed in Part I, infra, and
concluded that the Founders wished to list the qualifications for Rep-
resentatives and Senators so as to limit the power of the Congress to
exclude members for political reasons. 62 The Court concluded that
the Founders, fearful of the concentration of too much political
power in federal hands, left the electoral system to the judgment of
the voters. 63 Quoting Alexander Hamilton, the Court wrote that
"' [r] epresentation is imperfect in proportion as the current of popu-
lar favor is checked. This great source of free government, popular
election, should be perfectly pure, and the most unbounded liberty
allowed.'"64 Powell left open the question of whether states could im-
pose additional qualifications on their federal elected officials. 65 That
question was answered in 1995.
In 1995, in United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the Supreme
Court held that an Arkansas state constitutional amendment limiting
the terms of its members of the United States House of Representa-
tives was unconstitutional. 66 The Court reasoned that the Constitution
established fixed qualifications to prevent the possibility that Congress
might manipulate the qualifications to secure the election of a fa-
vored class of individuals.67 Alexander Hamilton argued in Federalist
60 that there was no way Congress could abuse the Elections Clause to
benefit one group or another because the qualifications for election
had been fixed at the time of the Constitution's adoption.68 The
Court's rule in Thornton, as in Powell, was based on two democratic
principles in addition to the text and history of the Qualifications
Clause.69 The first was an emphasis on the egalitarian concept that the
opportunity to he elected was open to all, and the second was the
principle that sovereignty ultimately rested with the people." The
Court quoted Robert Livingston's famous line: —The people are the
best judges [of] who ought to represent_ them. To dictate and control
them, to tell them who, they shall not elect, is to abridge their natural
62 See id. at 533-34.
G3 See id. at 540-41. In the debate at die Constitutional Convention, Gonvernor Morris
had declared that it would be more proper to regulate the qualifications of the electors
than tamper with their choices of elected officials. See 2 RECORDS, sepal note 33, at 121.
64 Powell, 395 U.S. at 540-41 (quoting 2 aim -Cs DEBATES, supra note 31, at 257).
65 Cf. No. 59, supra note '27, at 362.
66 United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,837-38 (1995).
G7 See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 792-93.
" See No. 60, supra note 38, at 371.
69 Thornton, 514 U.S. at 793-94.
" Id. at 794.
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rights."71 Therefore, the Court held that the Constitution prohibited
any government, state or federal, from abridging the right of people
to choose their elected officials freely through the adoption of term
Thornton followed Powell in resting its case not only on the text of
the Qualifications Clause but on "`an examination of the basic princi-
ples of our democratic system.'"" Justice Stevens wrote that "this
broad principle incorporated at least two fundamental ideas. First .. .
that the opportunity to be elected was open to all .... Second ... that
sovereignty is . vested in the people." 74
 This "broad principle" on which
the constitutional electoral scheme rests, requires removing the power
to decide whom shall be elected and why from any governmental
body." The substantive requirements for election to federal office
were set at the time of the Constitution and cannot be altered by the
federal government or a state government." The government is lim-
ited to regulating election procedures to protect the free choice of
the people, not to inhibit it. Thornton turned to this question of elec-
tion procedure in order to refute the state's contention that the term
limits provision was a permissible exercise of the state's power to regu-
late the "times, places and manlier" of elections."
Thornton rejected this argument on the grounds that "the Fram-
ers understood the Elections Clause as a grant of authority to issue
procedural regulations, and not as a source of power to dictate elec-
toral outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade
important constitutional restraitits." 78 The Thornton. Court recognized
the potentially revolutionary nature of allowing states to set term lim-
its for members of the federal legislature." It would necessarily follow
from the power of the state legislatures to set such limits that, accord-
ing to the Elections Clause, Congress could "make or alter" such regu-
71 Id. (quoting Powell. 395 U.S. at 541 n.76 (quoting 2 Et.uol"s DenivrEs, supra mute
31, at 292-93)).
72
 Id. at 837.
"Id. at 793 (quoting Powell, 395 U.S. at 548).
71
 Thornton, 514 U.S. at 793-04,
75 See id. at 835-38: Powell, 305 U.S. at 540 n.74. 541 n.713; 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATE'S. supra
note 31, at 292-93.
76 See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 820-21; Powell, 395 U.S. at 547-48.
77 See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 832-33. - •
79 See id. at 833-34.
79
 See id. at 837.
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lations--an outcome expressly rejected by the Framers in their craft-
ing of the Qualifications Clause."
Thornton acknowledges, however, that states and Congress have
an interest in protecting the "integrity and regularity of the elections
process."81 The state and federal laws upheld in a series of Elections
Clause cases were permissible because "they regulated election proce-
dum and did not even arguably impose any substantive
qualification."82 The Court approved of such regulations that assure
that elections are "'fair and honest and [that] some sort of order,
rather than chaos ... accompan[iesl the democratic processes.'""
Thornton establishes the constitutional principle that individual elec-
toral choice must be made free of government coercion or prohibi-
tion; to impose upon the electorate a governmental vision of their
electoral choice would he to "abridge their natural rights." 84 Powell
and Thornton clearly establish that government may not engage in
substantive decisionmaking for the electorate and may only enact
regulations to preserve the integrity of the procedures by which those
choices are registered in the political process.85 From 1880-1934, the
Supreme Court issued a series of decisions interpreting the congres-
sional power under the Elections Clause, cases that gave rise to the
Supreme Court's assumption of congressional power over campaign
finance in Buckley.
III. FROM SIEBOLD TO BUCKLE Y: THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE
In 1879, in Ex parte Siebold, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that the Congress had the power under the Elections Clause to
craft any electoral regulatory scheme it chose to protect voters in the
exercise of their rights of suffrage.86 The Siebold decision, while pri-
marily confined to an analysis of the balance between federal and
state power, described for the first time the extensive power of Con-
gress to assure that state governments did not interfere with a citizen's
federal right to vote.87 The provisions at issue in Siebold fell within the
See M. at 832.
Al Id. at 835.
" Thornton, 514 U.S. at 835; see also Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S.
208, 217 (1986); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).
83 Thornton, 514 U.S. at 835.
84 See id. at 794-95.
85 See id. at 835; Powell, 395 U.S. at 543.
86 100 U.S. 371, 383-84 (1879).
87 Id. at 385-87.
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realm of procedural protections described by Justice Stevens in the
majority opinion in Thornion. 88 The statute provided for federal elec-
tion monitors, appointed by local judges, to observe and protect the
polling places.89 Given the post-Civil War history of intimidation, Jus-
tice Bradley wrote that "Din the light of recent history, and of the vio-
lence, fraud, corruption, and irregularity which have frequently pre-
vailed at such elections ... the exertion of the power, if it exists, may
be necessary to the stability of our frame of government." 90
 The stat-
utes in question were passed for "regulating and superintending said
elections, and for securing the purity thereof, and the rights of citi-
zens to vote thereat peaceably and without molestation." 91 Having so
defined the nature of the statutes in question, the Siebold Court found
that Congress possessed the power to adopt such regulations and pro-
vide for their enforcement.92 Four years later, the Court revisited the
question of election enforcement statutes and again upheld the
authority of Congress to secure the individual franchise and the in-
tegrity of elections through regulations.
Iii 1884, in Ex parte Yarbrough, the Supreme Court ruled that citi-
zens' voting rights derive from the United States Constitution and
that the Elections Clause empowers Congress to protect them." The
defendants in Yarbrough were charged with intimidating an African-
American with the intent of preventing him from exercising his right
to vote.94 The Court reasoned that the power to protect individual
voters and secure the election itself from fraud and corruption was
essential to the concept of the sovereignty of a republic and based on
the Elections Clause.98 The Yarbrough opinion is based on those two
principles—basic national sovereignty and the Elections Clause .96
Without the power to protect individual voters, the federal gov-
ernment would be "left helpless before the two great natural and his-
torical enemies of all republics, open violence and insidious corrup-
tion."97 In analyzing the Elections Clause and Congress' action under
88 See id. at 379-82; cf. United Slates Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,835
(1995).
89 See Siebold, 100 U.S. at 379-82.
9°
 Id. at 382.
91 Id.
92 See id. at 392-93.
95 See 110 U.S. 651,660-62 (1884).
94
 Id, al 657.
95 See id. al 657,660,
96 Sec id.
87 Id. at 658.
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that grant of power, the Court categorized the regulations as regula-
tions of election procedure, similar to regulations eliminating the
general ticket for congressional elections. 98 At the end of • the day,
however, the Yarbrough Court saw the power at question to be one in-
herent in a republican sovereign to protect people in the exercise of
their right of suffrage. 99 The court wrote that "[i] t is essential to the
successful working of this government that the great organisms of its
executive and legislative branches should be the free choice of the
people as that the original form of it should be so." 108 Election regula-
tions were especially pertinent in republics where "political power is
reposed in representatives of the entire body of the people, chosen at
short intervals by popular elections, the temptations to control these
elections by violence and by corruption is a constant source of dan-
ger." 91
The Court warned that the violence at issue in the Yarbrough case
and "the free use of money in elections, arising from the vast growth
of recent wealth in other quarters, presents equal cause for anxi-
ety."102 If the government were left with "no authority to provide
against these evils, if the very sources of power may he poisoned by
corruption," then the American project would indeed be in jeop-
ardy. 103 The Yarbrough Court cast Congress' power to protect electoral
results from corruption in broad language, justifying, in some sense,
Buckley's reliance on Yarbrough for authority. More than four decades
later, the Supreme Court would again broadly define the congres-
sional power to regulate elections.
In 1932, in Smiley v. Holm, the Supreme Court ruled that the term
"legislature" in the Elections Clause referred to the entire lawmaking
power of a state and, therefore, a scheme of redistricting for federal
elections made pursuant to a federal statute, was subject to a guberna-
torial veto. 104 At issue in Smiley was Minnesota's redistricting plan,
adopted after the census of 1930. 108 The legislature had passed a re-
districting plan for the state's nine seats in the United States House of
08 See Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 660. The general ticket was a method for electing all of a
state's delegation to the lionsc of Representatives on an at-large basis. See id.
" See id. at 666.
1 °° Id.
101 Id.
1°2 Id. at 667.
1 °3 Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 6(17.
1 °1 See 285 U.S. 355,365 (1932).
105 Id. at 36142.
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Representatives. 1 °6 The Governor vetoed the proposal and the legisla-
ture sought judicial enforcement of its plan,w 7
 The Supreme Court
ultimately rejected the argument of the Minnesota legislature that, in
devising a redistricting scheme, it was exercising an agency power un-
der the federal Constitution and therefore was not subject to the lint-
its of the Minnesota Constitution.lim The Court ruled that the Consti-
tution contemplated the full exercise of state legislative power as
provided for in state constitutions. 109
Smiley also recognized that both Congress and the states derive
their powers over federal elections from the Elections Clause of the
federal Constitution. 11° There was no state power to regulate federal
elections prior to the adoption of the federal Constitution and be-
cause the only grant of authority to do so is in the Elections Clause,
both Congress and the states are bound by the same internal constitu-
tional limitations. 111
The most interesting part of the opinion, for purposes of discuss-
ing campaign finance regulation is the Supreme Court's articulation
of the broad range of legislation covered by the Elections Clause." 2
Chief Justice Hughes wrote:
The subject matter is the "times, places and manner of hold-
ing elections for Senators and Representatives." It cannot be
doubted that these comprehensive words embrace authority
to provide a complete code for congressional elections, not
only as to times and places, but in relation to notices, regis-
tration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, preven-
tion of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties
of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of
election returns; in short, to enact the numerous require-
ments as to procedure and safeguards which experience
shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental
right involved. 116
106 See id. at 361.
107
	
at 361-63.
108 See id. at 3151-63.
108 See Smiley, 285 U.S. at 365.
110 See id. at 366-67.
111 See id.; cf Thornton, 514 U.S. at 832.
112 Sre Smiley, 285 U.S. at 366.
118 Id.
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The Court then went on to define the role of Congress as that of a
general supervisor over state regulations, leaving the same power in
the hands of the states, absent the intervention of Congress. 114 The
Court's opinion in Smiley touches on Congress' broad power to regu-
late the procedures of elections to assure that the choice of the major-
ity within a district is given full force and effect by law." 5 Unfortu-
nately, the Smiley Court did not elaborate on this power, but the
description is in keeping with Siebold and Yarbrough on which it relies
and the electoral contours created by the Founders in the Constitu-
tion itself. 116 After Smiley, the Court turned its attention to one of the
campaign finance statutes passed in the early parts of the twentieth
century." 7
In 1933, in Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, the Supreme
Court upheld the convictions of two men accused of violating disclo-
sure and reporting provisions of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of
1925 ("FCPA")." 8 The FCPA required that the treasurer of a political
committee to keep detailed accounts of contributions and expendi-
tures and to file such reports with the clerk of the House of Represen-
tatives at specified times."° After quoting extensively from Yarbrough,
the Court ruled that "[t]he power of Congress to protect the election
of the President and Vice President from corruption being clear, the
choice of means to that end presents a question primarily addressed
to the judgment of Congress." 12° The Court continued: "Congress
reached the conclusion that public disclosure of political contribu-
tions, together with the names of the contributors and other details,
would tend to prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections." 121
The statute was permissible because "as a whole [it] is calculated to
discourage the making and use of contributions for purposes of cor-
ruption."122
114 See id. at 367.
115 See id. at 366.
116 See id. at 366-67; 2 RECORDS, supra note 33, at 240.
117 The Jim campaign finance law, popularly known as the Tillman Act, had been
passed in 1907, banning corporate contributions to political campaigns. See ROBERT F.
BAUER Se. DORIS M. KAFKA, UNITED STATES FEDERAL. ELECTION LAW 3 (1984). This was
followed by expenditure caps adopted in 1910 and 1911 and the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act of 1925 ("FCPA"). See id. at 3-4.
118 200 U.S. 534,548 (1933).
"2 See id. at 541-42.
12° Id. at 547.
121 Id. at 548.
122 hl.
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The Supreme Court picked up Burroughs' concern with corrup-
tion again in 1976, in Buckley v. Valeo. In Buckley, the Court held that
the contribution limits, diSclosure requirements, public financing and
the creation of a Federal Election Commissioner contained in the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 were constitutional.'" Buckley
was decided primarily on First Amendment grounds and relied on
Smiley, Yarbrough and Burroughs to justify the congressional power to
regulate campaigns in that way. 124
 The structure created by the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act and the Buckley decision remains the
foundation and the outline of federal election law today.'"
The Court's reasoning in Buckley was based on the analogy be-
tween money and speech in a given context.'" The Court struck
down one major provision of the law—its strict limits on campaign
expenditures—because the "expenditure limitations contained in the
Act represent substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on
the quantity and diversity of political speech." 127
 In contrast, a "con-
tribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate
and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the
support."'" This speech analogy has come under heavy criticism by
those seeking to overturn Buckley to permit more restrictions on cam-
paign expenditures and was rejected by Justice Stevens in his concur-
rence in ShrinkPA C. 129
 The state interest in campaign finance regula-
tion is the "prevention of corruption and the appearance of
corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of
large financial contributions on a candidate's positions and on her
actions if elected to office."'" While this interest was defined in the
context of a First Amendment analysis, it will suffice for a discussion
of campaign finance regulations under the principles of the Elections
Clause. Before moving to an analysis of the constitutional issues, how-
ever, an examination of corruption in the scheme of campaign
finance is necessary.
125
 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,143-44 (197(3).
124 See M. at 1311.16,14-15.
125 See BAUER & KAFKA, supra note 117, at 7.
126 See Burkley, 424 U.S. at 14-15.
127 Id. at 19.
125 id. at 21.
129 See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897,910 (2000) (Stevens, j„ concur-
ring).
136 !Willey, 424 U.S. at 25.
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N. ELECTIONS & BALLOT ACCESS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
Campaign finance regulations can have the effect of limiting the
numbers of candidates who are able to seek election and changing
the overall calculus for potential candidates as they weigh the decision
whether or not to seek a particular office. Under the current syStem,
for example, because candidates are limited to raising money in
$1,000 chunks, they must assemble a broad base of financial support-
ers and often must begin fundraising years in advance of the election.
Candidates for United States Representative are always less than two
years from their next election and those in competitive districts must
continually raise money and prepare for campaigns. Prior to the
adoption of the FECA in 1974, candidates could raise money from a
few wealthy supporters to begin their campaigns and seek money in
rather large chunks periodically. Now, candidates spend a consider-
able amount of time building up a "war-chest" in advance of the elec-
tion, well before other campaign activities begin. Whatever campaign
finance system is adopted, then, will have a profound effect on voter
choices and could operate as a bar to certain candidates or classes of
candidates. Such laws could be analyzed in an analogous fashion to
state ballot access laws, which have a long history in the Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny when examining state
ballot access laws."' Rights of political participation stand "poised be-
tween procedural due process ... and the First Amendment:432 At
the same time, voting rights must be made equally available and not
simply available and therefore contain an element of equal protection
analysis.' Regardless of its precise constitutional foundation, the Su-
preme Court has developed extensive election law jurisprudence. The
crux of electoral constitutional law is that while the rights of voters are
fundamental, "there must be substantial regulation of elections if they
are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos,
is to accompany the democratic process." 18 ' The Court has also held
that the rights of candidates are bound up with the rights of voters, as
"it is to be expected that a voter hopes to find on the ballot a candi-
date who collies near to reflecting his policy preferences on contem-
"I See Am. Party °flex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 780 (1974).
132 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1062 (2d ed. 1988).
135 .Sre id.
Srtst e Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
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porary issues."05
 A campaign finance regulation has the potential to
impact the choices of voters if it is drawn, consciously or not, to favor
a certain class of candidates. 156
In strictly scrutinizing ballot access laws, the Supreme Court is
not guided by a "litmus-paper test." Instead, a court must engage in
"an analytical process that parallels its work in ordinary litigation. It
must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury
to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
[and] ... then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put
forward by the State." 137
 In this balancing test, the Court critically ex-
amines both the nature of the state's interest and the practical opera-
tion of the ballot access restriction. 138
 For example, the Court has de-
clared that a state has no interest in protecting existing political
parties from competition and may not regulate ballot access in fur-
therance of that interest.'" But the Court has acknowledged that
states have a legitimate interest in requiring candidates to demon-
strate some modicum of support before they are given ballot access to
avoid confusion, deception, and potential frustration of the demo-
cratic process at the general election. 14°
Most recently, the Court decided the case of California Democratic
Party v. Jones, holding that California's open primary system violated
the rights of that state's political parties. 141
 The Court's analysis in
Jones can be readily transposed to a campaign finance regulation, as
the interests asserted by the state and rights pressed by the political
parties are similar. Additionally, the status of parties under the Consti-
tution can be analogized to the nature of modern political campaigns
that, while temporary, are essentially private associations devoted to
the election of a particular candidate and the promotion of that can-
didate's views. The constitutional analysis in Jones, which balanced the
important electoral rights of parties and citizens against the interests
of the state in conducting a certain sort of election, can be applied to
135 See Lubin v. Vanish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974).
"6
 One could readily see that a campaign finance law that permitted incumbents to
raise up to $5,000 from an individuals and challengers only $1,000 per person would he a
constitutional violation. It is the contention of Otis Note that the Supreme Court. in apply-
Mg strict scrutiny to campaign finance regulations ought to lake the practical effects of a
campaign finance law into account.
137 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
OS See id. at 790-93.
135
 See id. at 801-02.
140 Sedermess v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
' 41 See 120 S. Ct. 2402, 2414 (2000).
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campaign finance reform. Thus, this Note will consider the Jones case
in sonic detail.
In Jones, four California political parties challenged California's
blanket primary election law. 142 In a blanket primary, all candidates
from all parties appear on a single ballot. Each voter may choose one
candidate from the entire pool and the leading candidate from each
party advances to the general election." 3 The district court and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held for the state, but the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the lower courts gave insufficient weight
to the parties' interest in excluding non-members from the nominee
selection process. 144 The Court described the parties' status as quasi-
public, and stated that although their right to exclude is not as abso-
lute as those of purely private organizations, political parties are enti-
tled to First Amendment protection, 145 A state statute that burdens
the right to exclude must satisfy strict scrutiny where the party's ac-
tions do not otherwise violate the Consdtution."6 Subjecting the stat-
ute to strict scrutiny, the Court concluded that it impermissibly bur-
dened the parties' right to exclude. There was also evidence that the
threat of "party-raiding," were not insubstantial and that the nature of
the primary would force party candidates to moderate their positions
in order to appeal to an ideologically heterogeneous electorate. 147
Most interestingly, for campaign finance reform, the Court consid-
ered and rejected seven state interests advanced to defend the statute.
It is this process of interest analysis that was largely missing from Buck-
ley and, to a lesser extent, SluinkPAC. 148
142 See id.; Comment, California Democratic Party v. Jones, 115 liattv. L. REV. 269, 269
(2000) [hereinafter Comment]. The law was challenged by the Republican, Democratic,
Libertarian, and Peace and Freedom Parties. These four parties had by-laws requiring their
nominees to be selected in closed primaries. See id. at 271.
143 This is to be contrasted with partisan primaries, in which only voters of a particular
party (and independents in open primaries) select the party nominee and non-partisan
primaries where the top two vote-getters, regardless of party, adrance to the general elec-
tion. See Comment, supra note 142, at 270-71.
SeeJones, 120 S. Ct. at 2407.
145 See id. at 2402, 2407.
"6 See id. at 2407 & 11.5; Comment, supra note 142, at 271. The Court did so to distin-
guish Jones from the White Primary Cases, which held that there is no First Amendment right
to race-based exclusion from the electoral process. See Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2407 & n.5;
Comment, supra note 142, at 271-72.
147 SeeJones, 120 S. Ct. at 2411-12.
146 For example, in Buckley v. Vale°, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Court simply accepted the
$1,000 limit on individual contributions without any consideration of why this number is
proper to prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption.
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The seven interests advanced by California in Jones were: produc-
ing representative elected officials; expanding the candidate debate
beyond partisan concerns; increasing the power of members of the
minority party in districts controlled by the majority party; promoting
fairness; affording voters greater choice; increasing voter participa-
tion; and protecting privacy. 149
 The Court held that the first two inter-
ests could be rejected out of hand because they "are simply circumlo-
cution for producing nominees and nominee positions other than
those the parties would choose if left to their own devices."'" The
Court held that such an interest was incompatible with the freedom of
speech and expression embodied in the electoral system)" The third
interest, designed to increase the power of voters in the minority party
in majority-dominated districts, was also not permissible because it was
simply a "reformulation of an asserted state interest we have already
rejected—recharacterizing nonparty members' keen desire to partici-
pate in selection of the party's nominee as 'disenfranchisement' if
that desire is not fulfilled." 152
 The other four asserted interests were
potentially legitimate but had to be addressed not "in the abstract ..
but rather by asking whether the aspect of fairness, privacy, etc. . is
highly significant" under these particular circumstances)" The Court
considered each in turn, finding that each one lacked the significance
to be considered important or even contradicted the stated goal of
the law. Filially, the Court concluded that even if the interests had
been compelling the law was not narrowly tailored because the same
objectives could he achieved by a nonpartisan blanket primary. The
Court's strict scrutiny in Jones and all of its election law cases forces
the legislature passing the law to comply with the important constitu-
tional issues raised by any state intervention in the political process.
Concurring in Jones, Justice Kennedy observed that "Pin a free society
the State is directed by political doctrine, not the other way around."
The government may regulate election procedures to ensure fairness
and to keep elections free from corruption but may not impose its
own substantive vision of voters' choices.
"9 See Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2412-13.
10 See id. at 2412.
15 ' See id.
152 See id. at 2413.
155 See id,
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V. ANALYSIS
The theme that emerges from our consideration of both the
Founder's understanding and the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Elections Clause and the Qualifications Clause is that the govern-
ment, when regulating elections, may not impose its own substantive
will on the voters. The government may not do so directly by prohibit-
ing certain candidates from appearing on ballots or taking their seats
based on extraconstitutional criteria. Neither may the government do
so indirectly through election laws that are designed to promote the
election of one kind of candidate over another. 04 Nevertheless, the
aims of the campaign finance reform movement and those of the
Founding Fathers and subsequent interpreters are largely the same. 155
Both want to secure the rights of individual voters to cast their ballots
and have them counted in proportion to their percentage of the eli-
gible voting population choosing to cast ballots in a given election. 156
Both desire to keep the election free from corruption. 157
The Elections Clause has been interpreted—correctly in my •
mind—to embrace more than basic procedural provisions such as the
date of election and the existence of congressional districts. It has
been extended to protect the rights of individual voters and to secure
elections from corruption. But there must be some limit to the extent
that Congress can regulate campaign finance. The Elections, Clause
embraces all powers necessary and proper to protect the integrity of
elections and the rights of voters eligible to cast ballots in elections
and to do so without interference or fear of intimidation by public or
private actors.t 58 This power is extended to campaign finance regula-
tions to the extent that restrictions on the free rein of campaign
15.1 See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 2402, 2412 (stating that California's in-
terest in promoting moderation through the blanket primary reduced "to nothing more
than a stark repudiation of freedom of political association: Parties should not be free to
select their own nominees because those nominees, and the positions taken by those
nominees, will not be congenial to the majority. We have recognized the inadmissibility of
this sort of 'interest' before").
155 See a parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 658 (1884); Fred liVertheimer & Susan Weiss
Maines, Campaign Finance Reform: A F to Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 CoLum.
L. REV. 1126, 1127-31 (1994).
150 See Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 666; Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voters: A Constitu-
tional Principle for Campaign Finance, 94 CoLum. L. REV, 1204, 1204 (1994). Foley's argu-
ment goes a step further than the concerns of the Court in Yarbrough to embrace a notion
of equality of voice in the campaign process and not simply the protection of the individ-
ual franchise in the act of voting itself. See Edward B. Foley, supra, at 122G-28.
157 See Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 548 (1933).
158 Sec 1±7rblOifgh, 1 10 U.S. at 666-67; 3 RECORDS, supra note 33, at 311.
December 2000]	 it Constihttional Campaign Finance Refann
	 195
money are reasonably calculated to prevent the corruption of the
elections themselves or to prevent the intimidation of voters or inter-
ference with rights of suffrage.
The Qualifications Clause serves as an important constitutional
check on the power of Congress to erect barriers to entry not con-
tained in the Constitution. In keeping with the rest of its election law
jurisprudence, which recognizes the distinction between procedural
regulations and governmentally imposed substantive decisions, the
Court, guided by its ballot access precedents, ought to apply strict
scrutiny to campaign finance regulations. The government seeking to
regulate campaign finance should he forced to advance a compelling
interest to support the regulation and demonstrate that the regula.L
don is narrowly tailored to serve that end. Additionally, courts should
scrutinize the nature of the regulation to be assured that the cam-
paign finance regulation does not place an impermissible burden on
the rights of voters. While this test would erect substantial harriers to
the adoption of campaign finance regulations, it would allow for
significant regulation—as do the Court's ballot access precedents.
The success of the Court in navigating the rough constitutional and
political waters surrounding the issue of ballot access indicates that, if
it proceeds in a similar fashion with campaign finance laws, there is a
significant chance of success in this area..
The Supreme Court has noted the intimate connection between
the Elections Clause and the Qualifications Clause.'" The Court has
interpreted the Qualifications Clause quite narrowly, prohibiting the
state and federal governments from using other constitutional powers
that would effectively acid to the three stated qualifications of age,
citizenship and residency. 16° Underlying this interpretation is a deeply
rooted assumption that "the true principle of a republic is, that the
people should choose whom they please to govern them." 161
 The
Founders' political calculus depended on the system of checks and
balances created within the federal government, between the federal
government and the states, and between both governments and the
people who were the source of all legitimate political authority. 162
Popular elections are the "great source of free government" and
159 See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299,316 (1941).
160 See United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,837-38 (1995); Pow-
ell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,549-50 (1968).
161 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, MOM note 31, at 257.
Ifi2 See id. at 257-58.
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should be governed by "the most unbounded liberty allowed." 63 Ex-
cessive interference by the government with popular elections would
tend to mute their effectiveness as a check on governmental authority
and a guidepost by which representatives of the people can navigate
their policies. Yet these elections must also be "perfectly pure" 164 so as
not to fall victim to the "two great natural and historical enemies of all
republics, open violence and insidious corruption."165 Therefore a
balance must be struck between leaving elections sufficiently free of
governmental coercion to make them effective checks on federal
power while at the same time protecting them from corruption and
external influences that would damage the concept of popular gov-
ernment at the heart of democracy.
The balance is achieved in the concert of the Qualifications
Clause and the Elections Clause. 166 Under Qualifications Clause juris-
prudence, Congress and the states are powerless to set the substantive
criteria by which voters make decisions about candidates for office. 167
States cannot determine that voters should not elect United States
Representatives who have been elected to three terms or United
States Senators who have been elected to two terms. 168 The United
States Congress cannot prohibit voters from electing Representatives
who had committed acts of corruption while serving in Congress. 169 It
is simply beyond the power of any government to make substantive
judgments about the nature of the electoral choice of the body of the
people, except as provided for in the Constitution.
The first question that needs to be answered is a definition of a
substantive requirement. Clearly, the Court ruled that exclusion on
the basis of corruption imposed a qualification on Representative
Powell (and, by extension, all members of the House of Representa-
tives) that he not have violated anti-corruption provisions."° Just as
clearly, the Court ruled that the term limits provision in Thornton im-
posed upon candidates (and, by extension, on voters) the
qualification of not having been elected to the House of Representa-
tives three times or the Senate twice. 171 Because the power of both the
153 Id. at 257.
' 64 Id.
165 Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 658.
1 '4 CJ: Classic, 313 U.S. at 316.
167 See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 794-95, 837; Powell, 495 U.S. at 547-48.
166 Thornton, 514 U.S. at 784, 837.
'° See Powell, 395 U.S. at 490, 547-48.
170
	
id. at 490.
111 See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 784, 837.
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state and federal government to regulate federal elections has its ori-
gins in the Elections Clause, it would be safe to assume that the state
could not exclude a member for corruption and that Congress could
not impose term limits. 172
 The error made by the state government in
Thornton and by Congress in Powell was essentially the same. In each
case the governmental body imposed its own vision of who the people
ought to elect; they decided that the people should not elect a Repre-
sentative to a fourth term or elect as a Representative a man who had
violated anti-corruption provisions. In both cases, the Court struck
doWn the governmental action because it violated the principle that
"the people are the best judges of who should represent them." 173
Powell and Thornton, in some ways, were easy cases. The election laws
challenged in both cases effectively prohibited a certain class of indi-
viduals from directly holding a particular office.
Not all campaign finance regulations impose some substantive
vision of who should be elected to office but many do. For example,
by limiting the amount candidates may raise to $1,000 per contribu-
tor, per election, current campaign finance laws advantage candidates
who raise money in relatively small chunks. 174
 This does not necessar-
ily means that such a limit is unconstitutional, rather, it means that
the law must be justified by a compelling state interest. Just as the
Constitution prohibits the government from making substantive
judgments about whom the people may elect, it is also within the
powers of (and is, in some ways, the duty of) those governments to
protect the electoral choice of voters both in their individual and col-
lective capacities. 175
 The government is confined, then, to making
procedural safeguards for elections, and within that realm the power
of Congress and of the state governments are nearly limitless. 176 This
power over procedure, balanced against the substantive freedom en-
joyed by the electorate and preserved by the Qualifications Clause,
has its textual basis in the Elections Clause.'" The Elections Clause
172	 Stnileyv. Holm, 285 U.S. 355,36446 (1932). •
173 See Thornton. 514 U.S. at 794-95 Powell, 395 U.S. at 541, n.76 (quoting 2 Ei.uor's
DEBATES, Silpra note 31, at 292-93)..
171 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1) (A) (1994) (limiting contributions to $1,000 per individual
donor); see also Trevor Potter, Where are We Now? The Carroll Slate of Campaign Finance Law,
in CAMPAIGN FINANCE kr.ronm: A SotiRcEnoox 5-6, 9-10 (Anthony Corrado at al. eds.,
1997).
175 Cf. Yarlmough, 110 U.S at 666-67.
176 See Smiley, 285 U.S. at 366.
177 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4; see also 2 RECORDS, SlIPra note 33, al 240-41 (statement of
James Madison); 4 ElmoT's DEBATEs, ,s/ftt•o note 31, at 71 (statement of Mr, Steele).
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gives Congress and the state governments the power to protect "the
integrity and regularity of the elections process," and the Supreme
Court will uphold restrictions that regulate "election procedures" and
do not "even arguably impose any substantive qualification."" 8
The crucial question for the regulation of campaign finance is
whether a particular law imposes a substantive governmental vision on
the choice of the electorate or is simply a procedure for securing the
individual right to vote and protecting the electoral process from cor-
ruption. 179 To make this determination, it is necessary to establish a
working definition of procedure. The crafters and defenders of the
federal Constitution described what was meant by election procedure.
According to Madison, the questions to which the Elections Clause
was addressed included "[w] healer the electors should vote by ballot
or viva voce, should assemble at this place or that place; should be di-
vided into districts or all meet at one place [should] all vote for all
representatives or all in a district vote for a number allotted to the
district."180 Alexander Hamilton declared that Congressional authority
was to be "expressly limited to the regulation of the times, places and
manner of elections." 81 And, in the North Carolina convention, Mr.
Steele stated that "the power over manner only enables them to de-
termine how these electors shall elect—whether by ballot, or by vote
or by any other way." 182 Rufus King offered his own definition, de-
scribing the "manner" of Massachusetts' election as "by ballot, and the
places, towns."183
The Founders' descriptions make their procedural concept fairly
clear. The Elections Clause would, under the original understanding,
empower Congress to determine who gets to vote, where, and how. Of
course, elections have evolved considerably since the Eighteenth cen-
tury. The procedural focus of the Elections Clause, however, remains
consistent as is evidenced by justice Stevens' opinion in Thortzton. 184
178 Thornton, 514 U.S. at 835.
179 There is a close connection between the individual right to vote and the prevention
of corruption. See Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 660-62. Corruption dilutes the influence of an
individual voter. The right to vote and have that ballot counted is separate front the right
to receive and turn in a ballot—a right that would be essentially meaningless if' the votes
were not counted or additional ballots cast that served to dilute the influence of an indi-
vidual vote.
180 2 RECORDS, supra note 33, at 240.
181 No. 60, supra note 38, at 371.
182 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 31, at 71.
183 3 RECORDS, SUM Date 33. at 267.
184 See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 835.
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The Founder's concept of a procedural power has been carried
through in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Elections
Clause. 185
In Smiley, the Supreme Court listed the areas in which Congress
can regulate under the Elections Clause. Chief Justice Hughes wrote
that the power covered the regulation of "notices, registration, super-
vision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt
practices, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publi-
cation of election returns." 186 All of these activities are related to the
actual issuing and counting of ballots on Election Day and are de-
signed to assure the unhindered electoral choice of eligible voters. 187
"Notices" are posted to inform voters of the upcoming election with
the intention of allowing them to choose whether or not to cast a bal-
lot. 188 Notices do not require any specific action on the part of voters;
rather, they present information and leave the decision to the eligible
chooser. Voter "registration" helps to ensure the integrity of elections
by providing a list of those legally able to cast ballots. 189 This serves to
prevent the dilution of the votes of legal voters by interlopers seeking
to influence the election from the outside. Power to provide for the
"supervision of voting, protection of voters, duties of canvassers" 19°
hearken back to Siebold, where the Court ruled that Congress had the
power to provide for the enforcement of federal rights held by citi-
zens under the federal Constitutibn. 191 These three powers grow natu-
rally out of the power to regulate election procedures; without such
authority, the procedural safeguards needed for elections would he
useless. Finally, the power for the "making and publications of elec-
tion returns" allows Congress to require a uniform time for the an-
nouncement of election results in a timely fashion for several reasons,
including allowing for less time to interfere with the ballots after votes
have been cast.'" The final category delineated by Smiley is the "pre-
vention of fraud and corrupt practices."'"
188 See, e.g.. Smiley, 285 U.S. at 366; Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 657, 060; Siebold, 100 U.S. at
396,
188 Smiley. 285 U.S. at 366.
187 See id.
188 See id.
188 See id.
190 Sec id.
181 See Siebold, 100 U.S. at 382, 390.
192 See Smiled, 285 U.S. at 360.
193 Id.
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Regulation of campaign finances would fall under this last cate-
gory. 194 The inclusion of "fraud and corrupt practices" within this lit-
any of Election Day activities, tends to support a narrow interpretation
of the phrase. 195 The type of corruption covered by the Elections
Clause under the decision in Smiley would be corruption of the elec-
tion itself—voters illegally casting ballots, ballots being miscounted,
votes from beyond the grave, etc. Contrast this with the decision in
Buckley, where the Court ruled that campaign finance regulations
could be upheld to prevent corruption or even the appearance of
corruption and defined corruption as a quid pro quo—a campaign
contribution in exchange for governmental favor once a candidate is
in office. 196 This is not technically, however, a corruption of the elec-
tion since there is no charge that the candidate receiving the most
votes did not win or that ineligible voters cast ballots or that party ma-
chinery was used to manipulate the voting process. In short, the no-
tion that campaign finance regulations may be upheld on the
grounds that they prevent quid pro quo corruption or the appearance
of corruption is not supportable by cases prior to Buckley, and Buckley
itself does not adequately justify the nature of the state's interest in
preventing the appearance of corruption. As Gary Jacobson has
pointed out, the "appearance of corruption" is an incredibly vague
statement that is based solely on the subjective impression of the pub-
lic who may or may not really know what is going on. 197
Two things are clear from a reading of the main Elections Clause
cases. First, concern over corruption is aimed at real corruption of
the electoral process, primarily the addition or subtraction of ballots
in a given election. Second, the concern over money is not concen-
trated on the "appearance" that money has an inordinate impact on
the electoral process. When the Yarbrough Court expressed its concern
over the "free use of money in elections" it was not dealing with an
electoral system that was heavily regulated, in fact, it was completely
unregulated and campaigns focused not on television advertising or
141 See id.
195 Set' irl.
199 See Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976).
197 See Gary C. Jacobson, Campaign Finance and Democratic Control: Comments on Gottlieb
& Lowenstein's Papers, 18 HOESTR ► L. REV. 369, 377 (1989); Smith, supra note 9, at 1067
11.113.
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other means of persuasion but on large organizations devoted to
bringing (or bribing) loyal voters to the polls. 198
The constitutional principle is clear. The electoral choice of citi-
zens must be left to the citizens' own discretion. The Constitution
gives the people the right to make electoral decisions on their own
grounds without coercion from the federal government. The substan-
tive prohibition and the procedural power give effect to the electoral
choices of citizens. The prohibition of the Qualifications Clause pro-
tects citizens from the coercion of the government. The procedural
power allows Congress and state government to pi-otect the choice of
individual voters from external coercion and corruption. The Fram-
ers wanted a system that was "pure" and "free."i" 9
 Buckley failed in this
regard by deciding the case on First Amendment grounds instead of
basing it on the principles of the constitutional electoral system.
Using the constitutional electoral system as a guide, the debate
over whether or not money qualifies as speech should be irrelevant.
Government is not restrained simply by the speech aspects of the First
Amendment; rather, it is restrained by the limited nature of the Elec-
tions Clause, the limiting power of the Qualifications Clause, and the
political rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. What is needed,
then, is a balance between the government's interest in regulating
campaign finance and the rights of voters to choose from a wide
range of candidates and freely participate in the electoral process.
The government can regulate campaign finance if, under strict scru-
tiny, the Court determines that there is a compelling government in-
terest and that the regulation is narrowly tailored. The Court can look
to its own ballot access jurisprudence to find a ready analogy for ana-
lyzing campaign finance laws in this way. There, the balance is struck
between a need for a regular, non-chaotic. election process and the
rights of voters to choose whom they wish to govern them.'"
In Buckley, the Supreme Court ruled on four basic provisions:
contribution limits, expenditure limits, public financing and disclo-
sure and reporting requirements."' The Court upheld limits on indi-
vidual contributions because, the Court reasoned, they were only an
199
 See Yarlwough, 110 U.S. at 667. Interestingly, the Court lias ruled that the bribery of
voters is not a constitutional violation per se. See United States v. Bathgate, 246 U.S. 220, •
226 (1918).
199 Sre2 Eutar's DEndsmis. supra note 31, at 257.
20° SeeStorerc. Brown, 415 U.S. 724,730 (1974).
201 See Backley, 424 U.S. at 21,60-61,107-08.
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incident to free speech and not speech itself. 202 The limit of $1,000
per individual, per candidate is essentially arbitrary. 203 The Court did
not analyze why the number was chosen or why it was necessary to
prevent corruption of the system. The Buckley Court simply assumed
that it served the purpose of preventing corruption and the appear-
ance of corruption and could therefore be justified under a First
Amendment analysis. What the Court ignored is the substantive na-
ture of the $1,000 contribution limit. The limit, in effect, tells voters
that they cannot elect a candidate who accepts contributions in excess
of $1,0-00 because the candidate is inherently corrupted by that
money.204 This limit favors candidates who can effectively raise money
from a broad group of individuals who can write large checks rather
than the previous system that was largely financed by a few millionaire
supporters of candidates. 203 It removes from the voters the choice of
which kind of candidate and imposes upon the political process the
substantive view that campaigns financed by relatively small contribu-
tions are better.206 Absent a showing of the corrupting effect of a par-
ticular numerical contribution limit, such limits impose a view of elec-
toral choice on citizens and artificially limit not only the criteria on
which to base their decisions but the choice of candidates too. 207
In Buckley, the Court struck clown expenditure limitations on the
grounds that they impose "direct and substantial" limitations on the
free speech of candidates. 208 Under the formulation of the Elections
Clause argued in this Note, this aspect of the Buckley opinion would
stand. Expenditure limitations are the strongest substantive restraint
on candidates' conduct. The Congress, in enacting such restraints,
would be making a substantive judgment as to the amount of cam-
paigning that ought to be done by an otherwise qualified congres-
sional candidate.
Public financing presents an interesting question under the Elec-
tions Clause. On the one hand, it gives benefits to candidates, implic-
2°2 See id. at 26-27.
2°5 See id. at 27-28.
201 Cf. Powell, 395 U.S. at 543.
2°5 SeeSmith, supra note 9, at 1052-55.
2°6 Id. at 1062-63.
207 See LARRY SABATO F.c GLENN SIMPSON, DIRTY LITTLE SccRErs 23-28 (1995). SaI)ato
and Simpson outline the benefits given to incumbents and certain kinds of candidates by
the $1,000 contribution ceiling. This limit also requires a vast input of time in fundraising
operations and has served to discourage several nationally known figures from running for
office.
248 See firldthy, 424 U.S. at 39.
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itly making known a congressional preference for candidates who ac-
cept public financing. The current public financing system, which was
at issue in Buckley, is available only to Presidential candidates and is
purely voluntary. 20 Buckley upheld the subsidies under the spending
power in the General Welfare Clause. 210 Under the Elections Clause,
such subsidies would be suspect but would likely withstand whatever
level of scrutiny applied to them. The Qualifications Clause cases do
not reach the question of whether or not a government may express a
preference for a particular type of candidate. They only reach the is-
sue of whether or not the government may prohibit the election of
particular candidates based upon substantive judgments about what
type of candidate "should" be chosen by the voters. Public financing,
if approached in the proper fashion, may serve as a stimulant for the
types of campaigns Congress and the public desire, without imposing
a substantive vision on the public. A voluntary public financing system
would likely pass muster under the Elections Clause. Similarly, a sys-
tem like the one upheld in Buckley, but extended to congressional
elections, would likely be constitutional under an Elections Clause
analysis.
Under the Elections Clause analysis put forth in this Note, much
of America's current campaign finance laws and most radical propos-
als for change .would be held unconstitutional. This does not mean,
however, that our political processes must be forever doomed to the
corruption of money and the pernicious influence of wealth. Though
the Constitution prohibits the government from making substantive
judgments and then imposing them upon electors, it also imparts to
Congress the power to secure and enhance the voting power of indi-
viduals. To the extent that corruption dilutes the electoral influence
of voters, Congress may enact laws to protect electoral procedures and
secure the voting rights and influence of eligible individuals. In this
procedural sphere, the power of Congress is nearly unlimited.
The strongest measure Congress can take would be to require
more extensive disclosure of contributions and expenditures by po-
litical campaigns. The internet allows for nearly instantaneous disclo-
sure of campaign finances. These would be easily accessible by voters
and media sources within hours of a given contribution or expendi-
ture. Disclosure requirements add to the potential knowledge of each
voter and enhance each individual's capacity to make a reasoned and
209
 See N. at 114.
210 See id. at 118-19.
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deliberate choice at the ballot box. Disclosure can also be justified
under a corruption rationale. Sunlight often proves to be the best
cure for questionable political conduct. Without sufficient disclosure,
the possibility that secretive outside forces would enter into electoral
processes and corrupt them would increase.2 " Disclosure is the proto-
typical example of a campaign procedure that does not run afoul of
the constitutional electoral scheme. It is also a powerful weapon
against outsiders attempting to improperly influence an election to
secure benefits to themselves. Also permissible under the Elections
and Qualifications Clauses would be restrictions on last minute cam-
paign ads that do not give the opposition the chance to respond.
These ads can skew election results and make a reasoned independ-
ent judgment by citizens almost impossible, especially if the last min-
ute charges are particularly salacious or inflammatory. 212
What the Court must evaluate and what May, in the end, be dis-
positive is what interests are compelling. In Jones, the Court emphati-
cally held that producing a certain kind of candidate, a moderate one,
was not a permissible state interest, much less a compelling one.213
Campaign finance laws that are aimed at promoting the prospects of
certain ideologies would fitil this part of the test. The real question is
whether the promotion of equality is a sufficiently compelling state
interest to override the associational rights of the campaigns. The
campaign finance literature is dominated by those seeking to reduce
what they perceive as corruption that leads to au unequal distribution
of political power, with large contributors having undue influence be-
cause of their financial wherewithal. This is where the battle is cur-
rently joined and where it will be joined in the future. Given the space
constraints of this Note, there is not room to fully analyze this ques-
tion. Nevertheless, this much can he said: under an election law analy-
sis, the promotion of equality is more likely to be a constitutionally
permissible interest. Narrow tailoring, however, would likely put the
onus on states to publicly finance elections rather than restrict private
contributions. A voluntary system of public financing, it seems to me,
is the best solution for all sides in this controversy. The question re-
mains whether the political will exists to allocate scarce resources to
fund election campaigns.
211 See generally SABATO & SIMPSON. supra note 207, at 257-363.
212 See Bush Ad ACCILWS McCain of Opposing Cancer &search, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2000, at
Al.
213 See Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2412.
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CONCLUSION
Campaign finance reform will remain a contentious political is-
sue for many years. Calls for reform echo around the nation as it
moves into this Presidential election year. Candidates from both par-
ties have made well-publicized calls for more regulations and more
restrictions on the conduct of federal campaigns. While this Note has
disputed some factual claims made by many of the reformers, its focus
has not been on the substantive merits of the legislation. It may well
be that proponents of campaign finance reform are correct in sonic
of their diagnoses and that more reform is needed. However, the
Constitution does not merely prohibit misguided or unpopular legis-
lation. For that there is little need.
Regardless of the problems with extensive private financing of
political campaigns, the threat to liberty posed by significant cam-
paign reform cannot be understated. The Framers wisely formulated
an electoral system that left much of the choice to the people who
were charged with monitoring their elected officials. No system of
campaign regulation that detracts from this crucial, substantive role
played by the people—the source of all sovereignty—should he held
constitutional. The Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. %leo was in
error because it stripped too much of this substantive control from
the people. More extensive regulations would do further violence to
the concept of a free electoral system. Congress may enhance the sub-
stantive authority of the people through procedural safeguards but
may not restrict electoral freedom by imposing substantive require-
ments through campaign finance regulations. At bottom, the people
are responsible for assuring the accountability, honesty and integrity
of our elected officials. If the people fail in their task of eternal vigi-
lance, no system, no matter how perfect, can keep American politics
free. That is, as Thomas Jefferson wrote, the price of liberty, and we
ought not—and under the Constitution, cannot—appoint the federal
government to monitor itself for us.
MICHAEL MARCUCCI
